PERPETUAL TRANSITIONS

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Some see the Army's Transformation to the Objective Force as a new venture. The reality, however, is that the Army has undergone many transformations. Brown draws on his 50-plus years of Army Transformation experience to assess how the Army is doing in its current transition from a forward deployed force to an agile, adroit force-projection army that can meet the challenges of today's contemporary operating environment.

We will experience the same level of technological change in the first decade of the 21st century that we experienced in all of the 20th century.
—Colonel Kip Nyguen[1]

SUCH CHANGE IS a formidable prospect, even if it might be only half-correct. What does pervasive, unrelenting change mean for an Army already consumed in what appears to be global operations?

Of course, the U.S. Army endures as it has for decades—an enormous institution undergoing continual changes. Many changes seem externally directed, not internally stimulated. As a conservative organization charged with landpower national security, America's Army predictably seeks relative stability and certainty, but in actuality, it seldom finds either as it experiences perpetual transitions in policies and programs.

The Army is uniquely shaped by processes of transition, but often it appears surprised by change, at significant physical, spiritual, or professional cost to the institution. Yet, there is no "time out" to regroup and readjust. Clearly, if the Army is to continue to prevail in defense of the Nation, enduring change must be accepted and fashioned to build and rebuild, not resisted, which frequently erodes responsiveness to new requirements. Change must be accepted as the beneficial, sustaining lifeblood of a vital organization, not resisted as an unwelcome frustration to sustaining readiness. How can the Army welcome and mold change so that the institution grows physically and spiritually, thereby sustaining the warrior ethos?

First and foremost, change is the Army's steady state; the Army is always in transition. To illustrate, I draw on my own experience. From 1952 to 1989, I served in five distinctly varied armies: the post-Korean war army; the early Vietnam war army; the late Vietnam war army; the all-volunteer army; and the Reagan rearming army. More recently, I have been witness to the following manifestations: the Just Cause/Desert Storm army; the Clinton peace dividend army; the Transformation army; and the 9-11 army. If one considers the parallel changes that took place in reserve and civilian forces over the same time, more than eight or nine distinctly varied armies have existed, each affecting personnel in numbers greater than the entire strength of the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC).

All these armies were characterized by various changes in policies and programs from one army to another: war to peace, affluence to impoverishment,

public disdain to public acclaim, draft to volunteer, unilateral actions to coalition warfare. Today, the Army conducts global operations that rely on combined forces in varying coalitions. Associated threats, such as nonstate enemies or weapons of mass destruction (WMD), are becoming increasingly ambiguous. Some changes are transitory, such as coalition partners who can come and go as global security interests change.

The migration of leader tasks and skills downward from higher ranks to lower ranks . . . is a significant long-term change. Tasks and skills that formerly had been performed by more senior leaders are now being performed by leaders much more junior in rank and by leaders lower in the chain of command. The traditional demarcation between officers' and noncommissioned officers' spheres of responsibility is eroding.

The Army's collective perspective about the merit and inevitability of change within the Army sets the nature of the institution's response. Are changes perceived as threats to be minimized, ignored, or avoided, or are they perceived as beneficial opportunities to be embraced? The Army clearly benefits if it can assimilate change more rapidly than can other armies. The goal should be a culture that thrives on molding change to better serve America's landpower security objectives. The Army must make change beneficial and shape it to advantage.

When acknowledging the abiding presence of change, it is useful to think through how best to take advantage of the many transitions taking place. A framework for assessing change is needed. I suggest a framework of three forces or currents always at work in the Army. These forces sometimes reinforce one another, sometimes compete with one another, but they always influence change. The three forces are givens, which include enduring forces that tend to moderate if not to counter anticipated change; cycles, which wax and wane between opposite poles in response to changes in established policy; and long-term changes, which serve to magnify the effects of cycles. If leaders study how these waxing and waning, surging and ebbing forces or currents interact, leaders can act to intensify or to reduce these forces' effects. In sum, policies and programs sensitive to the forces or currents acting at any time can channel change to the advantage of the individual and the institution. This paper focuses on ways to advantage or to moderate the effects of perpetual transition.

Givens

Given #1: One Army. As citizen-soldiers have become more competent and experienced, one Army has become a given, not an expectation. The given of One Army developed gradually during the Cold War, then accelerated after the Cold War as the Active Component (AC) declined and the Reserve Component (RC) was drawn on more frequently to deploy. The RC has clearly demonstrated its proficiency while in harm's way, globally.[2]

All components share deeply felt belief and pride in selfless service to the Nation. Values of duty, honor, and country are firmly embedded throughout the Army, thanks to superb preparation by the Army's school system and excellent unit leadership. Also shared among active duty soldiers, Army reservists, national guardsmen, and Army civilian employees is mutual respect, gained through deployments together.

Given #2: Intergenerational tension. It is a given that the Army is made up of various generations of soldiers, and generational perspectives shape the Army. Currently, the Baby Boomer generation and Generation X dominate Army culture. Although a generation's root values remain constant, as each generation enters into and passes through its Army service, that generation's service experience influences its generational values.

The transition from an Army of Baby Boomers to an Army composed increasingly of Generation Xers is normal generational change with accompanying effects: more two-income families; acceptance of computers; expectations of significant diversity; routine global service. However, in a strongly hierarchical organization such as the Army, competition between the generations' lore exacerbates normal multigenerational tension.

Given #3: Personnel turbulence. Personnel instability, an unfortunate given during periods of the Army's growth and decline, has a profound and pervasive effect across all Army units. The effect is obvious—unending disruption of soldier and leader team cohesion. Soldiers change positions incessantly, which causes new teams to be created. These teams perform under challenging circumstances, then reform when personnel leave to pursue individual professional and personal development programs promised beforehand, and new soldiers take their places. In many cases, these programs were promised to induce people to volunteer in the first place.

However, there is good news. Instability provides an enormously broadened pool of shared soldier experiences that generates substantial consensus and a shared context of mutual global experience unequalled in any other major military. Diverse, proud, confident, competent, individual U.S. soldiers are


US Army

A 101st Airborne Division trooper scans a nearby ridgeline for enemy movement during Operation Anaconda, 4 March 2002.

In most crises, the Army is forced to be more reactive than proactive. But the expected outcome is certain: decisive victory in close combat, should that be required to win. Public expectations of a decisive Army victory in close combat, be it mounted or dismounted, desert or jungle, urban or rural, remains a vital given. The public expects the Army to be able to maintain a bayonet at the chest of any national foe anywhere in the world, for as long as the Nation wills.

important national strategic military assets. In fact, because of national support to accessioning incentives, the overall force is clearly mentally and physically above the national average of young people.[3]

Given #4: The contemporary operating environment. There is no longer a constraining, unifying focus of a predictable theater of operations, such as Europe provided during the Cold War.[4] The Army is subject to worldwide, no-notice deployment. As a result, in most crises, the Army is forced to be more reactive than proactive. But the expected outcome is certain: decisive victory in close combat, should that be required to win. Public expectations of a decisive Army victory in close combat, be it mounted or dismounted, desert or jungle, urban or rural, remains a vital given. The public expects the Army to be able to maintain a bayonet at the chest of any national foe anywhere in the world, for as long as the Nation wills.[5] All in all, that is a demanding national expectation.

Given #5: Joint operations. Landpower relies absolutely on airpower and seapower, including USMC expeditionary entry from the sea. The United States is fundamentally the global seapower, and it is now the global airpower. Landpower is essential to enforce national will but insufficient alone in winning wars. Consequently, the Army must be able to complement its Sister Services. That is a given. Maintaining and improving the Army's capabilities are clearly important because the bayonet at the throat is the ultimate deterrent and defense. However, the needs of national security as perceived by elected civilian authority must dominate. The Army must fit the larger purpose.

Given #6: Assimilating change. Aware of the importance of its mission to defend the Nation and the lives entrusted to its care, the Army has been and will always be a conservative institution that is uneasy with change, especially when the status quo does not seem broken. For change to take hold, the

benefits of change must be readily apparent not only to the Army's top and best leaders but also to the average soldier. That is a given.

Unfortunately, change often seems to originate from self-styled intellectuals, and the average soldier suspects change that originates from that quarter. Soldiers are uneasy with so-called good ideas that are enabled by an internal reallocation of resources and that threaten existing programs

There can be considerable frustration associated with achieving high levels of small-unit performance, even without taking into account the stress that differences in race, language, religion, and gender bring. The complexity can threaten the young leader who, under great stress, is trying to create a responsive, cohesive, and competent organization, but this complexity will become less significant as diversity becomes routine.

and their constituencies. Without clear evidence of the benefits of proposed change, the change will not take.

Fortunately, the Army has ready access to superb vehicles to assimilate change. The combat training centers (CTCs) provide important shared learning experiences. Opposing Force (OPFOR) doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) can reflect emerging threats that, when fought over the course of several rotations, can demonstrate the need for change to an attentive chain of command. Also, success or failure in the crucible of real-world operations provides another test and further evidence for acceptance of change. Either a thing works in combat, or it doesn't! If it works, there is rapid acceptance by all. Powerful vehicles to assimilate changes are available.[6]

Given #7: Full mobilization is necessary to win major wars. By tradition and recent practice, mobilized forces win major wars; however, this current given might be changing. "Come as you are" force readiness, quality personnel, Transformation, and extended reliance on the RC for routine missions, such as serving as the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in the Balkans, might be leading to a new given that says wars can be fought without expanding combat forces beyond highly trained prewar reserves. New landpower capabilities might have to be created for homeland security, but those forces should not be routinely in harm's way. Retirees could fill many of these positions. The reality of such an emerging given might be determined by another influence: long-term change.

Long-Term Change

Long-term change #1: Increased responsibility for junior leaders. An important development that has been occurring for the past decade is the migration of leader tasks and skills downward from higher ranks to lower ranks. This migration is a significant long-term change. Tasks and skills that formerly had been performed by more senior leaders are now being performed by leaders much more junior in rank and by leaders lower in the chain of command. The traditional demarcation between officers' and noncommissioned officers' spheres of responsibility is eroding.

In the late 1990s, platoon leaders in the Balkans experienced this in an even broader context. They became the guardians of military values and political, economic, religious, and social values in their assigned overwatch communities. Such complex task migration will become an even greater challenge as information technology accelerates across the Army. Task and skill migration downward will increase as information management evolves into knowledge management, accessible on the World Wide Web at virtual communities of practice such as CompanyCommand.com where young company commanders share professional experiences.

Long-term change #2: Broad public support for the Armed Forces. National public support of landpower seems likely to persist as terrorists remain a credible domestic threat and as the necessity of homeland defense is increasingly burned into the American psyche. This is an important long-term change from the lack of public support for the war in Vietnam. In addition, the increased capitalization of the close combat fight, as demonstrated initially in Afghanistan by U.S. Army Special Forces and airpower against Taliban forces, makes grinding combat, as experienced in Vietnam, unlikely, at least until credible peer-competitors emerge. Should they emerge, there might be better ways to engage and defeat them.

Should war ensue and the hedge of full mobilization be called on, national support will follow. Public support of the military is an enduring American characteristic and accords well with what can best be described as Jacksonian democracy: self-reliance, equality, individualism, self-improvement, financial esprit, and courage. A contemporary characterization might be "crabgrass Jacksonianism," supported by Joe and Mary Sixpack, who staunchly band together under the colors.[7] The 9-11 attack on the United States has stimulated this important long-term change.

Long-Term Change #3: Increasing diversity within the Army. The increased diversity in the Army seems to be a long-term change, but this highly



General Tommy Franks discusses operations with Special Forces personnel in Afghanistan. During the Vietnam War, Franks served as an aerial observer, forward observer, assistant battalion S3 and fire support officer.

US Army

The senior Army leaders of the Vietnam war received their baptism by fire in World War II. They spent little time at company, battery, and troop levels; rose rapidly to regimental and battalion command or staff; then paused. Today's senior Army leaders have a different experience. They came of age during multiple combat tours as platoon leaders or company commanders in Vietnam, then experienced several pauses between such actions as Desert One, Grenada, Panama, Desert Storm, Bosnia, Kosovo, and now Afghanistan. They have a solid understanding of life at company, battery, and troop levels.

beneficial trend has not been without birth pangs. Equal opportunity has come, but at a generational pace. In time, diversity will be represented at all grades. Diversity will become even more complex as the Army acknowledges the full range of human differences.

There can be considerable frustration associated with achieving high levels of small-unit performance, even without taking into account the stress that differences in race, language, religion, and gender bring. The complexity can threaten the young leader who, under great stress, is trying to create a responsive, cohesive, and competent organization, but this complexity will become less significant as diversity becomes routine. Yet, as is the case with potential racial tensions, the leadership challenge is present and growing for young leaders facing every aspect of diversity, including the diversity of sexual preference.

Cycles

Important policy debates within the Army set the terms of cycles. Generally, the underlying issue present in any cycle endures while the policies and programs for resolving that specific issue change from one clear policy alternative, or pole, to a competing policy, or pole, over generally unpredictable periods of time.

These poles are often represented by competing schools of thought. For example, consider the broad issue of Army management of resources. There are two general approaches to management: centralized management and decentralized management. Some years, centralization prevails; the Department of the Army (DA) decides how best to make use of slim resources or to stimulate change.[8] Other years, decentralization—decisionmaking at the lowest echelon—carries the day.

For obvious reasons, cycles tend to become hot buttons. Increasingly, routine cycles are exacerbated by external pressures, such as the war on terror, the rise of two-income families, and the health of the economy, to name a few.

Cycle #1: The draft versus the volunteer army. Today, the Army relies entirely on volunteers to man the force, although some wish for a force more equally representative of the strata of U.S.

society. However, there is little support for conscription.

There is, however, increasing concern that there are insufficient numbers of young people volunteering for important civic service, especially in light of 9-11. At issue is the creation of national public service separate from, but clearly linked to, postmodern concepts of national service. There is a clear need for more types of useful nonmilitary public service, such as providing competent volunteers to support hospitals and similar public service as is done in Germany. Support for or against volunteer forces seems certain to become an important discussion issue again. The cycle of quality soldier accessions might have peaked. In any event, prudence dictates that accession quality be treated as a cycle**,** not a long-term change, much less a given.[9]

Dominant solutions wax and wane, often in step with changing lore. Following World War II, airborne infantry dominated under successive chiefs of staff. In the 1950s, tactical nuclear weapon [were] assigned to maneuver battalions like mortars. . . . Now, networkcentric operations and Special Forces appear to some to be fashionable landpower solutions for global threats. Although the current mantra is faster and lighter, the capability to rapidly deploy a credible landpower force might not be desirable if the tradeoff is seriously diminished warfighting capability.

Cycle #2: Formative experiences. A fascinating cycle is service lore—the influence each generation's formative service experience brings to professional thought. "Where you were when" shapes a person's professional formation.

For the past 50 years, cyclical extremes have occurred. The senior Army leaders of the Vietnam war received their baptism by fire in World War II. They spent little time at company, battery, and troop levels; rose rapidly to regimental and battalion command or staff; then paused.

Today's senior Army leaders have a different experience. They came of age during multiple combat tours as platoon leaders or company commanders in Vietnam, then experienced several pauses between such actions as Desert One, Grenada, Panama, Desert Storm, Bosnia, Kosovo, and now Afghanistan. They have a solid understanding of life at company, battery, and troop levels, and they have a strong conviction about "No More Vietnams" and the need for broad public support before committing troops to combat.

Similarly, officers who were company commanders during the affluent 1980s expect to receive the resources required for full mission excellence. They are the upcoming strategic leaders of the Army. Theirs is not the perspective of officers weaned on the "Peace Dividend" of the Clinton years. Last, there will be commanders who have not experienced combat but who have profound shared experiences, such as service in the Ranger Regiment.

What were your formative experiences as a company commander or a first sergeant? Whether you were in combat early or relatively late in your career makes a significant difference in your perception. "Lore" is a dominating cycle—a reflection of senior leader experience.

Cycle #3: The dominant solution. Closely tied to the cycle of lore is the cycle of the "dominant solution." Dominant solutions wax and wane, often in step with changing lore. Following World War II, airborne infantry dominated under successive chiefs of staff. In the 1950s, tactical nuclear weapons, such as the Davy Crockett, a small-yield tactical nuclear weapon assigned to maneuver battalions like mortars, reigned as the dominant solution when they seemed the only answer to a Warsaw Pact attack in Europe. Over time, tanks, antitank guided missiles, and precision munitions become dominant.

Now, networkcentric operations and Special Forces appear to some to be fashionable landpower solutions for global threats. Although the current mantra is faster and lighter, the capability to rapidly deploy a credible landpower force might not be desirable if the tradeoff is seriously diminished warfighting capability. To close with and decisively defeat in close combat any enemy of whatever nature endures as the rationale for landpower, however unfashionable that capability might be.

Dominant solutions generally gather to themselves competing teams. For example, when airborne infantry reigned as the dominant solution, the "airborne Mafia," distinguished by Army A, centered on Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The "tank Mafia," the school of thought that championed heavy forces as the dominant solution, collected around Army B, the Seventh "Imperial" Army in Germany. I offer no value judgments here; I am just acknowledging that such cycles exist, that they wax and wane, and that they can influence important decisions.

Cycle #4: Funding. Funding is a clearly evident cycle understood all too well; it is usually feast or famine. Funding cycles can significantly influence allocations across the imperatives of doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldiers (DTLOMS). For example, in tank development, the cost of fielding a new tank might have been based on available funding, not on a logical mile-

US Army



A soldier practices emplacing an M18A1 Claymore antipersonnel mine.

Personnel specialists saw the Skill Qualification Test (SQT) for enlisted soldiers and Military Qualification Standards (MQS) for officers as personnel tools; trainers saw the SQT and MQS as training tools for developing individual skill proficiency. The personnel system won, and performance measurement was linked to the personnel system, enabling centralized promotion and selection for command.

stone in technology development. Organizational development often matches funding windows. The importance of this cycle is evident. Unfortunately, a general inability to influence this cycle is equally evident.

Cycle #5: Manning. Individual development versus unit development (personnel stability) is an extremely important and well-recognized cycle. To the frustration of many leaders, transition to the all-volunteer army gave individual soldier development a higher priority than unit personnel stability.

Years ago I was astounded to discover that artillery NCOs had 26 ways to withdraw from a proposed assignment to Baumholder, Germany. Each exception was an important, valid commitment made to access, then retain, quality soldiers. Efforts to develop stable units, such as Brigade 75 in the 1970s and the Cohesion, Operational Readiness, and Training (COHORT) battalions and companies in the 1980s, have foundered on the abiding pace of operational commitments assigned to the Army.

To date, the individual dominant pole of this cycle has prevailed, despite many frustrating unit rotations at CTCs.[10] Fortunately, the Army has had time to stabilize and develop cohesive units prior to combat. Where there is immediate deployment risk and the need for highly cohesive units, such as in Special Operations Command, unit personnel stability prevails over individual development; however, that is the exception.

Cycle #6: Promotion rates. Accelerated promotion due to the Army's expansion, then promotion slowdowns due to its inevitable contraction, seem to be a fact of life for career soldiers. An old adage warns, "You will stagnate; hope you can stagnate in a senior, not junior, position." There is not much to comment on here, but varying rates of promotion do contribute to a layering of service experience.

Cycle #7: Performance evaluation. Performance evaluation is a tough issue because the decision for more or less evaluation is strongly influenced by the purposes the evaluation will serve—training or personnel assessment. After Vietnam, the Army underwent a training revolution. The Army established clearly defined tasks, conditions, and standards by which to train and evaluate job

performance. To the trainer, all training is evaluation, and all evaluation is training. When effective after-action reviews (AARs) accompanied performance-oriented training, excellent training ensued. In contrast to the trainer's point of view, however, the personnel specialist saw performance evaluation as statistical evidence to support promotion or retention. The personnel system used job performance evaluation to determine who would be promoted and who would not.

American culture positively wallows in information, and so does the Army. And, the flood of information shows no sign of abating. Information is the lifeblood of networkcentric operations. Today, rarely will individuals make decisions without consulting vertically and horizontally. Is the centrality of superabundant information to the conduct of military operations a cycle or a long-term change?

This practice created tension that existed from the earliest days of the training revolution following Vietnam. Personnel specialists saw the Skill Qualification Test (SQT) for enlisted soldiers and Military Qualification Standards (MQS) for officers as personnel tools; trainers saw the SQT and MQS as training tools for developing individual skill proficiency. The personnel system won, and performance measurement was linked to the personnel system, enabling centralized promotion and selection for command.[11]

Today, digitization and information technology clearly requires demonstrated competent task performance and argues for reestablishing individual performance evaluations. The cycle seems to be moving back to the policies of the 1980s.

Cycle #8: Leader development. The leader development cycle poses generally competing goals. One goal is to develop warrior leaders; the other is to develop manager leaders. Should the Army grow generalists or specialists, professionals or bureaucrats? For officers, Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) 3 (formerly OPMS XXI) tries to address both. Warrant officer and NCO development now has generally similar goals. For enlisted soldiers, the cycle manifests itself as either a few broad military occupational specialties (MOSs) within a career field or many quite narrow MOSs.

The Army is approaching the broad "multifunctional soldier" pole of the cycle. DA civilians are more manager-specialist oriented. In general, "warrior generalist" prevails during conflict, and "manager specialist" prevails during routine peacetime, particularly when resources are tight. Increasing developmental requirements associated with joint and combined operations have recently muddied the cycle.[12] The cycle is there. It is important, and the period appears to be about 15 years.

Cycle #9: Senior leader development. Regrettably, cycles also prevail in the development of the Army's senior strategic leaders. For years, general officer development has been considered as the single most important responsibility of the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA). Unfortunately, not all CSAs seem to execute this obligation well. Whether because some CSAs do not welcome strong subordinates, or because of conflicting personality characteristics, or because the quality of the "bench" available to be considered can vary notably over the years, the reason is uncertain. The President, the Secretary of Defense, and senior congressional leaders all grade this paper, not just the Army. It is a tough interservice competition that the Army can ill-afford to lose but does when bench quality wanes.

A caveat to the discussion of cycles is in order. Cycles reflect the changing characteristics and requirements of the Army, which is an extremely complex organization.[13] Accordingly, one must beware of oversimplifications. Also, it can be disastrous to assume an issue is a given or even a long-term change when, in fact, the issue is about a transitory point in an established cycle.

Consider, for example, the high quality of young people being recruited today. An egregious error would be to assume that the high quality of young people being recruited into the volunteer force, drawn solely from the top 40 percent of U.S. society, would always be the quality of people the nation provides. Today's quality recruits might be a long-term change when compared to the quality of recruits inducted 30 years ago, but a never-ending stream of high quality soldiers simply cannot be considered a given!

Trends

Trends are perceived patterns of activity for which it is too early to tell if they represent a long-term change or are merely some waxing or waning stage of a short-term cycle.

Trend #1: Superabundant information. American culture positively wallows in information, and so does the Army. And, the flood of information shows no sign of abating. Information is the lifeblood of networkcentric operations. Today, rarely will individuals make decisions without consulting vertically and horizontally. Is the centrality of superabundant information to the conduct of military operations a cycle or a long-term change?

With unlimited information available, filters become more important. Who determines what information is filtered or aggregated and when? When personal digital assistants bring the classroom, or the theater of operations, to the individual 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, how is personal time to be protected?[14]

Overcoming the military community's isolation from the larger society either in war or peace is a trivial challenge. It is hard to imagine the military family isolated from the larger civilian community when most service members have Internet service providers that allow them to surf the Web and exchange e-mail with friends and family. Army Knowledge Online (AKO), which incorporates both information management and knowledge management, is but the precursor of extraordinary information availability.

Associated with the issue of superabundant information is establishing the degree of centralization of operations and decisionmaking. To date, more information seems to lead to increased centralization, but perhaps, this is just the pole of a cycle to be subsequently corrected, not a reflection of an enduring long-term change.

Trend #2: Coalition warfare. Increasingly, the United States is relying on partners to fight at lower echelons. Is this a cycle or a long-term change? Whether in revolving coalitions fighting the al Queda or immersed in political, economic, social, or religious interactions while conducting stability and support operations, Army units are increasingly unlikely to engage enemies unilaterally, even in small units, company and below. Partners with diverse capabilities will be commonplace in the maneuver fight.

Certainly there will be joint service partners, as practiced in Afghanistan. Frequently, they will combine with elements from other armies or civil organizations. Operations in collaboration with international and nongovernmental organizations become increasingly common.

The quality of Army elements joining in those partnerships is critically important, and winning the ground fight is likely to rest on the degree to which the partnership can achieve competence on the greatest number of tasks. Although the Army's competence to task, condition, and standard is important, a partnership's aggregate, grouped competence seems likely to be decisive. Training shared tasks to standard across cultures becomes vital to successful levels of performance. Achieving that standard will be a major challenge.

Trend #3: Integration of Active and Reserve Components. Relations between the AC and RC are improving consistently. It is desirable for the Army to sustain the Active Army, Army Reserve (USAR), and Army National Guard (ARNG) because this mix of forces reflects the unique characteristics of America as a democracy, as a Nation, as a Federal Republic, and as a State.[15] The Army's operating tempo (OPTEMPO) commits the RC abroad and for domestic security about as extensively as the AC, and citizen-soldiers have performed assigned tasks to standard.

The good news is that the USAR and the ARNG are accepted and tasked indistinguishably from the Active Army. The bad news is that the level of commitment might be seriously eroding both the concept and the reality of the citizen-soldier. Furthermore, it is consuming landpower "seed corn" at a destructive pace. And now, homeland security places new requirements on the ARNG. Is this OPTEMPO for the reserves a cycle or long-term change?

Army units are increasingly unlikely to engage enemies unilaterally, even in small units, company and below. Partners with diverse capabilities will be commonplace in the maneuver fight. . . . Frequently, they will combine with elements from other armies or civil organizations. Operations in collaboration with international and nongovernmental organizations become increasingly common.

Trend #4: Adaptive and self-aware leaders. The recent Army Training and Leader Development Panel quite correctly highlighted the importance of developing adaptive, self-aware leaders. This injunction seems likely to create a much more introspective force, and is likely a long-term change rather than a cycle.

The learning model used at CTCs provides a superb reinforcing vehicle. It incorporates a flexible opposing force, thoughtful observer-controllers, and searching after-action reviews. These challenge leaders by addressing expected and unexpected change in a "tactical 360" learning and assessment environment.[16] Emphasizing reflective, adaptive learning, combined with increasing institutionalization of DTLOMS as a new Army development model, offers the promise of accelerated improvement.[17] The Army appears poised to take off as a learning organization.

Implications for Leaders

Transition interrelationships are genuinely complex; however, there are really just three overarching questions that leaders must answer to influence all transitions: is the Army expanding (building); is it contracting (diminishing); or, is it transitioning from one to the other? For simplicity, I will discuss the

steady states of expansion or contraction.

A leader's recognition of both the prevailing condition and the likelihood of transition to the other are essential to the organization's success. Each state evokes varying combinations on the policy/practice continuum. Remember that a given is unlikely to change; a long-term change might be modified; and a cycle seems susceptible to influence. The point is that policies associated with the Army's growth are unlikely to be the same ones associated with decline. Furthermore, they are probably not even appropriate for the difficulties associated with transition.[18]

Leaders need to assess where they are with respect to a particular transitional force or current, then tailor their actions accordingly. They must determine whether by their intended policies and programs they would be responding to a mere cycle, which they might ride out with no action taken; be fighting a given, with low prospect of success whatever they do; or perhaps, be either bucking or reinforcing a long-term change.

Therefore, prudent leaders should routinely conduct informal estimates of where in their respective areas of responsibility the Army is in its odyssey of perpetual transition. They should then think through the probabilities of success and the likely next steps as the forces or currents play out. Using the management example again, if the mood is strongly pro decentralization, it is probably an inopportune time to propose a major change to centralize.

I suggest a three-step analytical process:

1. Identify the transition forces underlying the policy issue being analyzed.

2. Determine where current policy/programs are within the flow over time of the particular transition. Is the Army building or diminishing? Is the force or current a given, a long-term change, or a cycle? Are forces or currents waxing or waning? Is the policy/program under review near a pole or limit established from past practice?

3. Seek leading indicators of future developments within the particular transition element be it given, long-term change, or cycle. Sometimes the indicators are clearly there if one looks through a lens of understanding of the dynamics of transitions. For example, the current community of practice Companycommand.com, combined with AKO, is a clear leading indicator of accelerating decentralization. So is the growing concern about over-centralization of the personnel development system-centralized promotion and selection for command.

These three steps should provide a start in thinking through how to analyze, then how to advantage, perpetual transitions. Viewed from this perspective, how has the Army been doing? I believe quite well. Several examples follow where good work has clearly been done, then areas where low-hanging fruit can be taken, and finally, areas that really need work.

The Army's use of the Internet has been visionary. AKO, Army Knowledge Management (AKM), and virtual communities of practice, such as CompanyCommand.com, are thriving. The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth has created solid brigade and battalion commander learning experiences such as "Think Like a Commander" and "Duffers Drift," which are being prepared for AKM dissemination.

The Good News

Recruitment. The Army of One recruiting campaign has countered a long-term change in young people's reduced propensity to enlist. This recruiting campaign is supported by aggressive reenlistment campaigns to reduce the recruitment requirement.

Clear command emphasis on developing adaptive, self-aware leaders acknowledges several givens: initial conflict will be "come as you are." Adaptive, self-aware attributes are essential when largely reacting, and leaders possessing those attributes will be much more receptive to adapting to novel good ideas. The long-term change this policy addresses is the Army's fighting alongside joint and combined partners. A dominant solution cycle might be moderated, as more adaptive leaders are less likely to be enamored of temporarily fashionable quick fixes.

Personnel assignment policies. Personnel instability in units, a serious given**,** has been addressed by 100 percent manning of divisions, which reduces turbulence created by meeting assignment shortfalls. One hundred percent manning also is a highly visible policy nod of support to unit development in the cycle of individual development versus unit development. One hopes this is a start on a road to unit replacement to the extent that unit size and purpose make this feasible. Effects on quality accessions in the recruited force due to reduced individual development opportunities caused by unit rather than individual replacement remains to be seen.

Information technology. The Army's use of the Internet has been visionary. AKO, Army Knowledge Management (AKM), and virtual communities of

practice, such as CompanyCommand.com, are thriving. The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth has created solid brigade and battalion commander learning experiences such as "Think Like a Commander" and "Duffers Drift," which are being prepared for AKM dissemination.

No RC unit should deploy to a potential combat zone without CTC experience in the unit leaders' lore, just as no AC unit would deploy in like condition. A CTC training opportunity, or its equivalent that includes rigorous OPFOR, sharp observer-controllers (OCs), and thorough AARs, should be as available for RC combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) units as it is for AC combat, CS, and CSS units.

Using the Internet to share and disseminate information recognizes the long-term change of leader task migration downward to junior leaders and the increased sharing of global deployment experiences. It is too early to assess the affect information sharing will have on the warrior versus manager cycle, but I suspect that the timely sharing of warfighting information through AKM will contribute immeasurably to regrounding the warrior professional ethos.[19]

Soldierization. There has been a welcome increase in the soldierization that takes place during initial entry training. This is vital reinforcement of the given of foundational Army values of duty, honor, and selfless service to the Nation, and it responds to the long-term change of the increased diversity characteristic of the Army. As diversity increases, so must the unifying focus of shared professional values inculcated at both school and unit.

Balanced imperatives. The Army understands the importance of balance when developing DTLOMS imperatives. Institutionalizing the DTLOMS paradigm has provided an important foundation for the Army to thrive on perpetual transitions by addressing several givens. Balanced DTLOMS reassures us that when the Army fights "come as you are," always at unexpected locations and times, the force will have balanced capabilities.[20]

Vision. To thrive, any organization must have as part of its overall vision a vision of an improved future state or a range of improved capabilities to perform its mission. For the Army, this vision of improved capabilities is the evolving Objective Force. This effort addresses vital givens—the abiding purposes of landpower and reinforcement of public support. The Objective Force might suffer because of its being marketed as the solution to whatever ails the Army, but the effort to field the Objective Force is typical in the dominant solution cycle as the Army strives to field new and essential capabilities.

Some News Could Be Better

Learning technology. The pace of force projection is intense. There would seem to be numerous opportunities to exchange on emerging capabilities of the Internet officers' and NCOs' experiences and professional observations. Whether sponsored by the Center of Army Lessons Learned, AKM, or virtual communities of practice, direct leader exchanges could better supplement institutional learning in addressing long-term changes, such as the downward migration of tasks to lower leaders in the chain of command or increased information-sharing to create and sustain highly proficient teams of leaders. There is great potential here to supplement formal institutional learning, but such supplementation is off to a slow start as TRADOC guards traditional institutional learning resources.

Performance evaluation. The rigor of training created by the codification of task, condition, and standard is severely reduced if not largely made irrelevant if there is no evaluation of performance. Unfortunately, the Army's use of evaluation is highly cyclical, both for individuals and units. Practiced extensively in the 1980s, both now appear to be at low ebb in their cycles. Individual performance evaluation is gone. Unit performance evaluation, as measured by Army Training and Evaluation Program standards, also is greatly reduced, although informal unit evaluation continues, in part because it is integral to the CTC learning model. Consistent internal and external evaluation of individual, team, and unit performance should return.

Doctrine and TTP. Common doctrine and TTP, particularly unit standing operating procedures (SOPs), varies considerably, perhaps reflecting implicit synchronization with the performance evaluation cycle. Reduced commonality precludes easy evaluation comparisons, and with less evaluation, there is less need for the shared rigor of common SOPs to ensure consistent actions under stress. The absence of unit SOPs is unfortunate in the face of the long-term change of increased operations with joint and combined partners and the given of personnel instability present in most units. Common SOPs should be mandated across Objective Force units of action.

Areas That Need Attention

The thoughts above largely summarize known and well-proven measures that address perpetual transitions but are currently in disuse for a combination of reasons. Other measures would be new. Thinking through perpetual transitions in terms of givens, long-term changes, and cycles makes their necessity apparent. Several follow.

CTCs. "Come as you are" force projection is a given. Increased mutual reliance between AC and RC units deployed as One Army is an evident long-term change. Increasingly, deployed forces consist of regulars and citizen-soldiers. The need for superbly prepared units is no less in one component than in another. Yet, the CTCs are used largely by the AC. No RC unit should deploy to a potential combat zone without CTC experience in the unit leaders' lore, just as no AC unit would deploy in like condition. A CTC training opportunity, or its equivalent that includes rigorous OPFOR, sharp observer-controllers (OCs), and thorough AARs, should be as available for RC combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) units as it is for AC combat, CS, and CSS units. Similarly, CTC-like RC support training opportunities should be made available for AC units earmarked to support ARNG units committed to homeland defense. The CTC learning experience for leaders, leader teams, and units is too powerful for the majority of the Army to neglect, however costly that experience might be in new requirements for dollars, people, and time.

Time. Time is today's scarcest landpower resource. The long-term change of increased use of information management and knowledge management augurs increasing time pressures on individuals and units.[21] The use of time has links to the important warrior-leader versus manager-leader development cycle. Time must become a resource allocated, albeit uncomfortably, by both warriors and managers in such manner as to reinforce the professional, not the bureaucratic, ethos.

Accession. Accession quality is cyclical, yet the Army is understandably addicted to quality personnel. Consumed with surviving during years of resource anemia, the Army has done little contingency planning for lower quality accessions that more closely represent the broader American society. The Army has also not considered sustaining current quality with much shorter enlistment periods. Contingency planning is required to address hedges.[22]

The examples above are framed as likely policies and programs that might result from thinking through givens, long-term changes, and cycles in an Army facing perpetual transitions. Add or subtract issues or examples as you will. Neglect the ebb and flow of these forces or currents at your peril. ***MR***

NOTES

1. Kip Nygren, "Emerging Technologies and Exponential Change: Implications for Army Transformation," *Parameters* (Summer 2002): 92.
2. Comparison might even be inappropriate because all components increasingly deploy together. The ARNG is clearly the third or fourth most capable landpower in the world. Officers' and NCOs' experiences increasingly match AC officers' and NCOs'. These vital, shared values might now be expanding to encompass a new joint perspective, post-Goldwater-Nichols.
3. A situation is unlikely to prevail postmobilization in which the Army must access from the entire population instead of judiciously accepting, as it can fortunately do now.
4. Korea remains an important focus for a reinforcing corps.
5. Rapid deployability is useful; sustained capability to dominate in close combat is vital.
6. Clear dominance employed at a CTC or in actual combat provokes rapid acceptance, stimulated by highly credible independent proofing.
7. Walter Mead, *Special Providence American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World* (New York: Knopf, 2001), 218-63.
8. Excellent current examples are installation management and information management resources, both being centralized at DA.
9. For a consideration of possible hedges against a reduced quality of accessions, *see* Frederic J. Brown, "Quantity over Quality and Hedges," *Military Review* (July-August 2002): 64-69.
10. In fairness, the National Training Center was originally envisioned as a training vehicle for individual leaders. As long as the Army places high priority on quality accessions in a recruited force, individual incentives are likely to rule over imperatives of unit stability and cohesion.
11. Current advocates of decentralized promotion did not suffer the unfortunate situation before OPMS when who you knew determined promotion and command selection. Respected independent evaluation systems were essential for selecting leaders based on demonstrated competence, especially amid growing awareness of equal opportunity.
12. Other factors come into play. In the early days of OPMS, functional career tracks were fashioned to ensure a logical flow of assignments that led to promotion to general officer for the most senior and, one hoped, most competent officers.
13. *See* Gordon R. Sullivan and Frederic J. Brown, "America's Army," *Military Review* (March-April 2002): 3-8.
14. *See* "Imperatives in Transition," *Military Review* (September-October 2002): 81-91, for a discussion of the use of time.
15. For an extended discussion of the synergies of One Army, *see* Sullivan and Brown, "America's Army."
16. To those who oppose 360-degree evaluation, it is worth noting that it is an established practice at the CTCs, to the obvious benefit of the Army's readiness.
17. Sullivan and Brown, 7-14.
18. Transitioning from one pattern of operations to another, such as from the offense to the defense, is difficult, even when anticipated. It is much more difficult when transitioning is unanticipated, unless the organization is very experienced. No different here.
19. For a thoughtful study of this important issue, *see* Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins, *The Future of the Army Profession* (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2002). They address the cycle of profession versus bureaucracy.
20. Violation of this is precisely the concern about the announced cancellation of Crusader. For an extended discussion of the futures of DTLOMS, *see* Brown, "Imperatives in Transition."
21. Ibid.
22. *See* Brown, "Quality over Quantity and Hedges."

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